Diese "Alles-oder-Nichts-Politik" ist nicht neu.
Auch Sadat war davon beseelt. Dazu kommt noch
diese seltsame Mentalität: Engegenkommen und
Kompromissangebote werden von Arabern fast immer
als Schwäche ausgeleget was sie meist dazu
veranlasst den Druck zu erhöhen. So etwas mag im
Mittelalter mal gegolten haben - aber heute wohl
nicht mehr...

Manchmal frage ich mich ob Sadat wohl jemals
realisiert hat wie knapp sein Land vor einer
Katastrophe stand?

8. Juni 1967. Eine F-4E Phantom II der US Navy war
schon unterwegs nach Cairo. Als das Flugzeug nur
noch knapp 10 Minuten vom Ziel entfernt war,
stoppte der damalige US-Verteidigungsminister
Robert McNamara den Angriffsbefehl.

An Bord der Phantom: eine 25 MT Wasserstoffbombe.

Am 21. Oktober 1973 dito. Auch eine Phantom. Sie
stand schon auf der Piste in Ramon IAF. Ziel:
Cairo. Ladung ...

Dies wurde Sadat mitgeteil.

Hussein bekam zeitgleich auch eine Mitteilung
darüber, dass er in einem Viertelstündchen ein
»Paket« geliefert bekommen würde...

(...)

Zwei Tage später: UN-Resolution 339
Der Yom Kippur Kieg war zu Ende.

Smadar schrieb:

Der Mann hat den Durchblick!

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,26621
6,00.html

Israel´s Policy After The War
From April 1948 onward, the Yishuv was pressed to
allow refugees to return. Arab leaders and
spokesmen for various groups (inhabitants of
Jaffa, Marionettes from the Galilee, and so on)
demanded repatriation, as did international
figures, including Count Bernadotte [who saved
many European Jews citizens from the Nazi
Holocaust and on September 17 1948 he was murdered
by the Stern gang which was commanded by Yitzhak
Shamir] and United States and Britain.

Western pressure brought about two Israeli offers
to allow a measure of repatriation as part of an
overall peace settlement. In July 1949 Israel said
it would take back "100,000" ( 65,000, once those
who had already returned or were in the pipeline
were deducted), if the Arabs states agreed to
resettle the rest in their own lands and conclude
a peace settlement. Alternatively, Israel might be
willing to incorporate the Gaza Strip into its
territories and absorb the Strip´s population of
60,000 native inhabitants and 200,000 refugees. In
this way, Israel would have done more than its
fair share toward resolving the problem---which,
its officials tirelessly argued, was not of their
making. (OR, as Ben-Gurion was fond of telling
Western interlocutors, "Israel did not expel a
single Arab.")

The offer was seen by the Arabs as far too little,
and most of the Arab states insisted that Israel
take back all the refugees. Egypt was unwilling to
hand over the Gaza Strip---its sole territorial
gain of the war---even though this would relieved
Cairo of the burden of a large, impoverished,
subversive population. During the following years
of the refugees themselves rejected efforts to
resettle them in the Arab states. They wanted to
"go home," and the Arab states---save Jordan which
gave them citizenship--- did little to absorb
them, seeing in them and their misery a useful
tool against Israel. Israel refused to allow them
back, both because it needed the abandoned lands
and houses for new immigrants and because it
feared the refugees´ potential for
destabilization---so the problem remained to
plague the Middle Eats, and indeed the world.

http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Palestine-
Remembered/Story562.html